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Abstract 
Drawing on a decade of research on terrorism in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, we show 
how subjective ‘rational choices’ motivate some women to engage in terrorist activism. 
Focusing on the motives of young women who engage in terrorism is consistent with 
feminist theory’s insistence on women’s agency – even at the extremes. In addition to the 
well-established motivations for terrorism reported in the literature, interviews with 
young women involved in terrorism reveal mixed personal motives for their gender 
defying choices, including thrill-seeking and some conscious rebellion.  However, we 
contend that women’s subjective rationale for participation in such violent behavior 
needs to be contextualized. A cost-benefit approach, we maintain, highlights the strategic 
considerations supporting the deployment of women as combatants by Palestinian 
terrorist organizations. We argue that the inclusion of women in terrorist activism in the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict exposes a major fault line in attitudes to the role and proper 
place of women in what remains largely a patriarchal culture. This social ambivalence 
accounts for why, on all measures, women fare worse than their male counterparts. The 
implications of the findings for feminist research as well as policy are discussed.  
 
Introduction  
In many conflict areas around the globe women’s participation in violent extremism 
constitutes a key feature of what has been termed ‘New Terrorism’ (Laster and Erez, 2015). 1 On 
some estimates, approximately one third (Narco, 2008), or even half, of terrorist acts in some 
parts of the world are now committed by women, although the proportion of women involved 
varies according to the specific terrorist organization and theatre of conflict (Cragin and Daly, 
2009: 103).   
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Drawing on a decade of research into Palestinian terrorism, including interviews with 
women incarcerated for terrorism-related activities, we examine the subjective accounts of why 
some women choose to engage in violent extremism. Taking women’s views seriously remains 
an important feminist method that acknowledges women’s agency- even at the extremes. In 
contrast to the stereotypes typically invoked to explain the seemingly inexplicable, careful 
qualitative research casts women as rational actors who make choices about their behavior, albeit 
in the context of their particular circumstances and culture.  
However, focusing merely on individual choice typically ignores or underplays the 
cultural, communal, social, and organizational context of terrorism. We argue that it is therefore 
just as important to consider terrorist organizations’ calculation of the costs and benefits of 
engaging women as active combatants.   
This article provides a Palestinian case-study of how a cost-benefit approach can augment 
and contextualize the growing phenomenon of women’s involvement in the terrorist frontline. 
We argue that a rational choice approach at the individual level, coupled with an organizational 
cost-benefit analysis at the organizational level, affords a better framework for understanding the 
phenomenon of women’s involvement in terrorist activism, at least in the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict. 
We contend that a cost-benefit approach accounts for the symbolic and strategic benefits 
that women bring to terrorist activity, and that these are consciously exploited by terrorist 
leadership (e.g. Bloom, 2011b; Laster and Erez, 2015). For terrorist organizations, as well as the 
women involved, though, including women is not without cost, requiring significant concessions 
to be made to cultural sensibilities.  
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We show how Palestinian women’s engagement in terrorism exposes cultural fault-lines 
and presents a major challenge to established power relations. As in many other contexts, women 
who find themselves at the pointy end of such cultural ambivalence fare markedly worse than 
their male counterparts. And women’s involvement in terrorism has significant negative 
consequences for other women who then suffer the negative consequences of being treated as 
potential combatants.  
We begin with a discussion of the growing phenomenon of women’s involvement in 
terrorist activism, particularly their relatively recent entry into the field in the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict. Employing a ‘rational choice’ perspective, we go on to present the reasons advanced by 
women themselves for their involvement, noting the methodological challenges of using 
qualitative approaches to research motive. We then show how a cost-benefit approach can 
provide a wider contextual lens by identifying the strategic benefits, as well as the costs, for 
Palestinian terrorist organizations recruiting women into their ranks. But these women, we 
suggest, are worse off as a consequence of their involvement. We conclude by considering some 
implications of a cost-benefit approach for feminist theory and public policy, especially counter-
terrorism initiatives. 
The Female Face of Terrorism: The Palestinian Context 
In some conflict zones, women have been actively engaged in relatively large numbers, 
including occupying leadership positions, in terrorist organizations (Cragin and Daly, 2009). In 
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the Palestinian leadership has only relatively recently allowed 
women to be directly involved in what has hitherto been the exclusive preserve of men--active 
combat roles in terrorist missions against Israeli targets, including as suicide bombers. It is 
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important to assess the import of this significant shift in policy, particularly the responses of the 
women involved.  
Generalizing about culture is always a fraught exercise. Cultures are not monolithic and 
Palestinian society is complex, with a diversity of religions, socio-economic stratums, 
educational backgrounds, and differential rates of urbanization. But predominantly, the social 
order of Palestinian society particularly in the rural areas of the West Bank and Gaza, remains, 
according to insider commentators, tribal in structure and conservative (Hamamara, 2019). A key 
feature of this conservativism is strict adherence to gender- (and age-) based social hierarchies,  
resulting in unequal gender role division (Rubenberg, 2001; Tamimi, 2017). 2, In theory and 
practice, women (and children) are relegated to a dependent and inferior status (Tamimi, 2017). 
A woman’s social value is largely determined by the extent of her seclusion and obedience 
(Hasan, 2005); her activities are largely confined to the private sphere while participation in the 
public domain is highly restricted (e.g. Haj-Yahia, 2003; Hasan, 2005; Hamamara, 2019). 
Women’s identity and worth is assessed according to their capacity to fulfil their role as wives 
and mothers (e.g. Tamimi, 2017; Hasso, 2005).  
Palestinian women are expected to maintain their honor, centered on the preservation of a 
chaste reputation. Women’s purity and virginity is highly valued and, when compromised, (e.g. 
by rape or other circumstances that cast a shadow on a woman’s modesty) it reflects badly on 
their male guardians, who are presumed to have failed to protect and control their womenfolk 
(e.g. Baxter, 2007; Hasan, 2005).    
Men are expected to protect and monitor the behavior of their female blood relatives.  A 
woman who exhibits inappropriate or immodest behavior,3 violating gendered scripts of social 
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relations, brings shame and dishonor on all of her kin (Hasan, 2002, 2005). A family’s reputation 
is closely tied to the honor of its women, so violations of gender expectations (such as a 
woman’s unsupervised contact with men) constitutes a grave offense  that requires the 
restoration of the family’s honor through punishment of the woman, which, in extreme cases, can  
lead to her death -- the so-called “honor killings” phenomenon (Hasan, 2002; Baxter, 2007).  
In line with cultural dictates, prior to 2000, Palestinian women’s role in the nationalist 
political agenda was clear and limited: they were expected to sustain Palestinian aspirations 
through childbearing (of future fighters) and taking care of their families. Their obligation was to 
show unwavering support for their husbands and to inculcate national-organizational ideology in 
their children.  Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat, for example, often referred to the womb of the 
Palestinian woman as "the best weapon of the Palestinian people," recognizing women’s power 
to produce children to fight Israel4 (Berko & Erez, 2007; Erez and Berko, 2008). Sheik Ahmad 
Yassin, the founder and former Hamas leader,5 also emphasized women’s role in childbearing 
and argued that they should not be direct participants in military operations (Berko, 2007; 2012).  
The surprising aspect of Palestinian women’s involvement in terrorism in recent decades, 
however, is how quickly these long established and deeply held cultural values were displaced in 
the interests of pragmatic political ends. Patriarchy, once again, demonstrated itself to be 
opportunistic and adaptable (Laster and Erez, 2015).  
Following the onset of the second intifada (uprising) in the 2000s and the escalation of 
Palestinian hostilities, including waves of suicide bombings that resulted in numerous fatalities, 
Israeli security procedures were significantly tightened, eliciting a more aggressive response 
from the Palestinian leadership. The decision to put more active foot-soldiers on the ground led 
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to a shift in thinking about the role of women in the national struggle. The Palestinian leadership 
came to accept women’s involvement in terrorist activism. Yasser Arafat, in his later years, for 
example, modified his views about the participation of women combatants, proclaiming that 
women are not just "the womb of the nation" but "my army of roses that will crush Israeli tanks" 
(Victor, 2003, p.19).  
Technology facilitated this shift in policy as guerilla warfare became more accessible and 
‘democratic’. Suicide bombers require limited physical strength and training to wear a bomb 
which can be detonated at the press of a button. More significantly, the internet has proven to be 
a highly effective tool for disseminating propaganda aimed at recruiting new, including female, 
volunteers (Berko and Erez 2007; von Knop 2008). For women, the on-line world has afforded 
them opportunities for engagement beyond their tight family circle coupled with the privacy to 
pursue clandestine activities, including involvement in terrorism (Berko and Erez 2007). Women 
were suddenly able and, with new modes of persuasion, willing to assume active roles in the 
terrorist enterprize.  
Following the first suicide bombing perpetrated by a woman in 2002 under the aegis of 
Fatah, other organizations, including Hamas, began to recruit women, recognizing their tactical 
usefulness. Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, the Hamas leader at the time,  modified his restrictions on 
women waging jihad, initially lifting the requirement that they be accompanied by a male 
relative as chaperone if the mission is for 24 hours or less, and then eventually embracing 
women’s involvement without qualification (Israeli 2004; Bloom 2004: 150).  
In 2005, Hamas announced the establishment of a special unit of women to fight Israel. 
These women - mostly wives or sisters of Hamas activists- claim that they joined terrorism "not 
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to compete with men but to implement Allah's orders6." A few years later, in response to Israeli 
military attempts to stop Palestinians firing rockets into Israel’s southern towns, the Islamic Jihad 
(another Palestinian fundamentalist organization) threatened to flood Israel with female suicide 
bombers.7  
Although women are increasingly called upon to assume active resistance roles, the 
traditional gender framework still lingers: women are meant to balance support for the national 
struggle while preserving Arab/Islamic constructions of femininity (e.g. Ali, 2006). For example, 
still in September 2012, the Facebook page for Fatah in Lebanon posted a picture of a mother 
dressing her young son in a suicide belt. The picture is accompanied by an imaginary 
conversation. The child asks his mother, "Why me and not you?” with the mother replying, “I 
will stay in order to give birth to more children for the sake of Palestine.” (Palestinian Media 
Watch, 2012).  
What then makes some Palestinian women defy expected gender norms and take part in 
terrorist activism and what are the consequences of them doing so? 
Gender and Motivation for Terrorist Activism 
Decades of research has now definitively refuted the common stereotype of male 
terrorists as mentally ill or with particular personality disorders (e.g. Post, 2009; Horgan, 2014). 
This finding applies equally to female terrorists (see review by Jacques and Taylor, 2009).  
However, the widely accepted taxonomies, which seek to capture the motivations of those who 
commit terrorist acts (e.g. motivations for suicide bombing in Jacques and Taylor, 2008) are 
incomplete and have methodological limitations.  
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The social science accounts of New Terrorism, including acts committed by women and 
girls, have focused mostly on female agency (e.g. Ali, 2006; Bloom, 2011a; 2001b; 
Cunningham, 2007). The pervasive stereotyping of women is also well-documented in feminist 
writing on women and terrorism (Laster and Erez, 2015). For example, feminist analyses have 
highlighted the consistent bifurcation of women terrorists as either heroes or hapless victims (e.g. 
Nacos, 2005; Marway, 2012). Yet policy interventions to deter women from engaging in such 
lethal activity require a contextual appreciation of the push and pull factors influencing the 
involvement of some women, as well as the personal consequences of their gender-defying 
activism. 
In line with  other researchers in this area (e.g. Hausken 2016), we  submit that decisions 
made by individual women to engage in terrorist activism are best understood  within the loose 
rubric of contemporary versions of ‘rational choice theory.’ Under the broader model of 
‘bounded rationality,’8 individuals make decisions from a position of imperfect knowledge and 
under conditions of uncertainty. In the anthropological sense, ‘rationality’ is embedded in the 
inconsistencies and paradoxes built into all cultures (Kuznar, 2007). Research has documented 
that women join terrorist groups for a variety of reasons, including avenging another's death, 
recruitment pressure, marginalization by society, and ‘serving as pawns in a man's game’ (Simon 
and Tranel, 2011). Research on female suicide bombers identified personal reasons (such as 
revenge for a loss of significant other) as more prominent than religious or nationalistic motives 
(Jacques and Taylor, 2008).  
Based on extensive interviews with women terrorists and their families and friends in 
diverse trouble spots across the globe, Mia Bloom (2011a; 2011b) developed a typology of four 
(plus one)9 overlapping motivations for why women choose to engage in terrorist activism. They 
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include: Revenge (at the loss of significant others or other political grievances); Redemption 
(women volunteer or are volunteered to perpetrate suicide bombing to erase moral blemishes, 
commonly resulting from actual or suspected sexual contacts outside marriage that tarnishes 
“family honor”); Respect (admiration from other Palestinians for their honorable contribution to 
the cause), and Relationship (with men who are involved in terrorism).  
Given that local conflicts remain the critical motivator for participation in terrorism (Ali, 
2006), we analyze interviews of Palestinians engaged in terrorist activism that describe their 
experiences and views as combatants,  and Palestinian leaders’ perspectives about the 
involvement of Palestinian women in terrorism. Taken as a whole, the narratives provide a more 
nuanced evaluation of the choices made by women themselves, and the apparent organizational 
benefits and costs of involving Palestinian women in terrorist activism.  
Methodology and data collection 
The data for the study included interviews with the following: first, in-depth interviews 
with incarcerated Palestinians who perpetrated various acts of terrorism. They included 14 
women aged between 18-29 at the time of the interview, although some were adolescents at the 
time of their involvement. We also interviewed 10 adult men (age 22 and 36), and 10 adolescent 
males.  
Two of the women interviewed were Israeli Arabs (citizens of Israel), with the remaining 
12 women and the 20 male adults and adolescents from the Palestinian territories -- the Gaza 
Strip and the West Bank. All the interviewed women were unmarried. The women also had 
higher levels of education than the male terrorist interviewees, with two having some university 
level education.  
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The participants were selected to represent severity levels of the various security-related 
offenses, including dispatchers, (failed) suicide bombers, combatants, and those who knowingly 
harbored or provided material assistance to terrorists, or aided and abetted terrorist missions. For 
the women it also included some who recruited other women for operations, or who 
accompanied men to a target as cover.  
 In addition to interviewing participants in terrorism, the data set includes interviews with 
10 Palestinian leaders and community notables, all of whom were male.  Half (N=5) of the 
leaders were imprisoned at the time of the interviews, having been arrested or sentenced for 
planning terrorist attacks or involvement in security violations. The other half included 
Palestinian spiritual leaders and Shari’a judges. All leaders and community notables were 
selected for their prominence and influence in the political and communal life of Palestinians 
living in the territories of Gaza and the West Bank.  
Lastly, the data include interviews with six Israeli legal and law enforcement agents 
tasked with processing terrorism cases in the courts as well as attending to incarcerated security 
offenders in Israeli prisons.  
The interviews with imprisoned Palestinians were conducted in the Israeli adult prisons 
and youth wings of prisons for security offenders; the interviews with those outside prison were 
conducted at their workplace.   
The interviews with male and female activists sought to examine Palestinian terrorists’ 
life course within their structural, social and cultural contexts to establish their pathways into 
terrorism (see Mayer, 2009). The structure of the interview was open:  interviewees were asked 
to tell their ‘life story’ in their own terms (Denzin, 1989), with only occasional interjections for 
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clarity.  The topics consistently covered by all interviewees included their childhood, milestone 
events, significant relationships, and their aspirations for the future. Interviews with Palestinian 
leaders and notables centered on their views on participants in terrorism in general, and on 
women’s participation in particular.  
Interviewing procedures complied with all IRB requirements as well as the guidelines 
issued by the Israeli Prison Services’ Ethics Committee. The interviews lasted between 2-4 
hours, which, for logistical reasons, occurred over two or three meetings spread over days, 
weeks, or even months in some cases.  
Interviews with the incarcerated Palestinians and community notables were conducted in 
Arabic, Hebrew, or English, according to the participants’ preference. The interviewees were 
initially suspicious but once they accepted that the interview was for research purposes rather 
than a security related interrogation, they seemed keen to participate, volunteering their views 
and experiences in a relaxed and conversational manner. The interview narratives were 
transcribed, translated, and analyzed using grounded theory approaches (Charmaz, 2006).  
To ascertain their validity, interview data were compared with the military court case 
files about the violations involved, as well as with the prison records of the interviewees. There 
appeared to be only a few minor discrepancies between the official record accounts and the 
information obtained directly from the participants’ interviews.  
Findings and Discussion 
 Stated motivations and their limits 
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In telling their life stories, the participants described the circumstances that led them to 
become involved in terrorist activity, their reasons for involvement, mode of recruitment, their 
beliefs, and how they felt about their choices, along with their expectations of what engagement 
in terrorist activity would bring them. The data allowed us to document participants’ stated 
motivations for engaging in terrorism, and to make some general comparisons between the 
expressed motives given by the female interviewees with those offered by the adult and 
adolescent male subjects.  
We found some significant differences between men and women’s stated motives for 
involvement.  In accordance with prior research findings (Jacques and Taylor, 2008), Palestinian 
men tended to focus much more on ideological factors than the women.10 The other significant 
factor for men was gender status enhancement. Both Palestinian adult men and adolescents, for 
example, described how they felt “manly” through their participation in terrorism, with the 
adolescents emphasizing their improved social standing among their male peers. Some male 
operatives explicitly asserted that their activism helped them to recover their manhood in the 
emasculating environment created by the “occupation regime.” Monetary rewards, which would 
flow to their families through their involvement in terrorist activism, was also a common factor 
noted by male prisoners.11 
The motivations for engagement in terrorism reported by the female prisoners generally 
support Bloom’s categorization. For instance, several women talked about revenge for the death 
of a brother, a cousin, and in one case, the death of a fiancé involved in terrorism. In the words of 
this woman, “…he was the most beautiful man in the world…he wanted to marry me and the 
Israelis killed him…” 
 13 
Uniquely for the women interviewees, relationships, real or imagined, loomed large as a 
significant motivator. Romantic involvement with, or wish to marry men involved in terrorism, 
was often a primary driver. A Palestinian woman who agreed to accompany a Palestinian man on 
a mission as cover for the kidnapping of an Israeli taxi driver, for instance, maintained that, “He 
[promised to get engaged to me and] asked me to come with him so I did.” She added that her 
father was angry with her as she brought shame on him and the family, but then wistfully added, 
“I do not know if the man took advantage of me. I miss him a lot ...” 
Compared with the men, the incarcerated women focused far less on their desire for 
respect or social status. Only one female interviewee maintained that she expected people to 
respect her for what she had done. An interviewed legal officer, who had tried many terrorism 
cases, summarized the differences between the approach of men and women in court as,    
A woman would claim that she has acted out of stress or desperation; quite often   
we hear the argument that ‘it was the situation that forced me to do it.’ A man 
would usually just admit that he did it, and would do it in a defiant manner, to get 
more points in regards to the manhood aspect. 
 
A few of the interviewed women admitted that they had been coerced12. In a well-
documented tragic case, a young woman who had been burnt and severely disfigured in a 
cooking accident, was pushed by her parents to become a suicide bomber.  Her father, in her 
words, “was beating me and told me I will never get married and I will be a cripple for the rest of 
my life”. By forcing her to ‘volunteer’ the family sought to dispose of a daughter who they 
perceived to be a burden on the family. Another woman wanted only “to train with weapons,” 
but then was compelled to follow through with the suicide mission. 
The interviews, though, suggest that at least in the Palestinian context, some of Bloom’s 
categories need to be augmented or at least refined.  Religion (independent of political ideology), 
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for example, is a prevalent leitmotif among women (as well as for some men). A number of 
female interviewees, for instance, maintained that they engaged in terrorism to reap rewards 
based on their religious belief systems, such as the promise that they will ascend to paradise, and 
become one of 72 virgins who serve the Prophet and his companions. In one instance, a women 
interviewee projected a religious motivation on to male suicide bombers, “In my opinion, a 
shaheed (martyr) hands himself over to Allah and therefore the underlying reason for his suicide 
is religious”. 
Ideology, revenge, and religion though are often intertwined for Palestinian women, 
particularly for those who have had direct or family experience with the Israeli Defense Forces 
(IDF). For example, one of the women, a Palestinian university student whose combatant brother 
had been killed by the Israeli military, pressed a recruiter to allow her to undertake a suicide 
mission so she could become a shaheeda (female martyr) “against the Jews, for revenge and for 
paradise…” Another woman stated that, “all Israelis are the enemy of Allah and the enemy of 
Islam”. Still another interviewee commented, “In paradise there is everything that we want. 
Paradise is for the Muslim and Hell is for the Jews. In Paradise I will marry the man I wanted to 
marry.” 
The interviews also identified other motivations beyond Bloom’s taxonomy. For the 
young women we identified  a broad category of ‘Rebellion’ that includes,  at one end of the 
spectrum,  thrill seeking and relief from ‘boredom,’ (see Katz, 1988), and at the other end, 
though less frequent, the conscious flaunting or disruption of gender norms.  To that extent, as 
we argue below, “seductions of terrorism” affords a better theoretical framework to capture these 
quite distinct motivations.13  
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The search for excitement and relief from boredom was a major driver for some of the  
young women interviewees. Getting out of the controlling environment of the home, 
interacting with men outside the purview of the family, and experiencing the exhilaration of 
male operatives preparing them for a mission was, to apply  Katz’s term, hugely ‘seductive’ 
for women coming from a highly restrictive social system. A chance to take off the veil or 
wear tight western clothes on the way to the target were noted as particular highlights by 
some of the young women. Training in the use of weapons by the shabab (the guys) or 
secretly travelling to the targeted sites was reported by a few Palestinian female adolescents 
as an attractive feature of doing “military work”. 14  
The women in our ‘Rebellion’ category were also more likely to comment on the 
relative freedom that they experienced in prison: “here in prison I have more freedom than 
home; I can wear whatever I want. I listen to whatever music I like, as loudly as I want, and I 
speak on the phone with whoever I want.” For women from a culture which relegates women 
to the private sphere, these are powerful motivators.  
A few of the women interviewees also described personal psychological rewards: a 
feeling that they were “different” or “unique”, because they were making a direct contribution to 
the national cause: “I did something that is manly. There are hardly any women who are doing 
what I have done.”  
Yet, apart from the act of participation, we found little evidence of any direct challenge to 
patriarchal gender roles among the female interviewees: 15 
It is natural that men direct the world. . . . Men have more physical ability than  
women. The percentage of brain capability and wisdom of men are not larger  
than women’s, but men have the ability to realize their brains’ potential and  
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women do not.  
Another explained that, 
Our religion says that it is not good for a woman to be a leader, because she  
does things from the heart and not from the head. Our prophet Mohammed says  
that a woman is not like a man. The man is better than the woman according to  
religion; because we have our menstrual period and when we have our period  
we do not pray and therefore we are less than men. We do less with our head  
because we think and make decisions from the heart. We are more sensitive  
than men.  
 
Even the one or two women who explicitly saw their involvement as defying gender norms, 
observed that: 
 There is no difference between a man and a woman in the intifada [uprising].  
. . .We all want to protect our land . . . there is no difference in the recruitment  
of a guy or a girl, but the percentage of women that are recruited is lower  
because there are women that have another role in society. Every woman is  
a homemaker; this is the main barrier which prevents women from being  
recruited.   
There are always methodological problems with discerning ‘true’ motives, especially 
given the sample bias of our interviews with participants who had failed in their missions. It is 
impossible to know if the men or women who succeed in their missions, are more highly, or 
differently, motivated than our cohort of interviewees.  Generally though, the participants 
probably failed for extraneous reasons, such as quality intelligence which led them to be 
intercepted, or in the case of failed suicide bombers, being lucky (or unlucky depending on one’s  
point of view) to be caught through, for example, faulty equipment,  a random search, or 
suspicious behavior.  
Ethnography though, is less about ‘truth’ than ‘ascertaining meaning’ (Horgan, 2011).  
Inevitably, accounts are ex post facto rationalizations and efforts at individual sense making. 
They are legitimizing exercises, which probably recast actions in the most favorable light for the 
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benefit of peers, political organizations, and family members (Hamm, 2018; Horgan, 2011).  For 
our activist cohorts, expressed motivations constitutes useful data even if these are 
reconstructions or rationalizations for joining the cause, or for their failure to complete their 
mission.  
Another potential limitation of our method is that the interviews had to be conducted in 
security detention facilities, and thus likely to encourage socially acceptable responses (Hamm, 
2018). Reflecting back on one’s past actions, especially being interviewed by strangers aligned 
with the ‘enemy’ (see Ozacky-Lazar, 2010) can be illuminating, but is, just as likely,  an exercise 
in second-guessing the most advantageous way of telling one’s story. We suspect, for instance, 
that the women interviewees may have underplayed sexual contact or exploitation because they 
were ashamed to reveal details, which, in their cultural worldview, would tarnish their 
reputation. It might also be the case that some of the women understated their ideological 
motivation and political standpoint when talking to political adversaries, although this did not 
deter the male participants from expressly addressing such matters during the interviews. 
Jails are their own social world and women inmates have to make significant adjustments 
to prison culture, including their presentation of self (Hamm, 2018; Horgan, 2011).  For instance, 
some of the women interviewees became ‘born-again Muslims’ in prison, replacing their 
Western clothing with traditional religious dress, praying regularly and participating in religious 
study groups often under the influence of a dominant woman leader.   
More generally, as Jack Katz notes, regardless of how skilfully and carefully we 
undertake qualitative research, ‘motivation’ for past behaviour is complex, mixed, and eludes 
easy categorization (Katz, 1988; 1991). Finally, although discerning subjective motivation is 
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important, too great a focus on individual accounts risks overemphasizing agency at the expense 
of structure (Giddens, 1984; Sewell, 1992).16  As some feminists contend, the level of both 
symbolic and actual violence against women in deeply patriarchal societies, where structural 
victimization and agency co-exist (e.g. Serendip, 2012), means that it is almost impossible to 
isolate choice or agency from the wider context in which women’s individual decisions are made 
(McKinnon, 1987).  Individual motivation or ‘rational choice’ needs to be understood as part of 
the broader social context, which underscores decision-making by terrorist organizations and 
their leadership about the deployment of women as combatants.  
Women as Good (Terrorism) Business 
Current scholarly approaches apply cost-benefit principles to crime control efforts 
generally (e.g. Roman et al., 2010) and to terrorism in particular (e.g. Hausken, 2018). It is now 
well acknowledged that terrorism constitutes a rational (albeit deadly) enterprise (Post, 2009), 
based on its own corporate logic (Shelley, 2014, Gill et al, 2018). To that extent, cost-benefit 
analysis provides an important contextual frame for unravelling the rationale for involving 
women in the business of terrorism.  
Cost-benefits analysis, including the program logic of a corporate enterprise underlying 
terrorism, is now routinely employed to the analysis of terrorism (Giacomello, 2004; Shelley, 
2014), as well as in the development of particular counterterrorism measures. (e.g. Gill, 2018 ). 
As Shelley (2014:176) summarizes, “Economic analyses of terrorists have drawn strong parallels 
with the legitimate business world, describing terrorist organizations as hierarchies, franchises, 
brand strategists, and venture capitals,” as they maximize the advantages of different ‘trading’ 
environments. These realms include material, technological, and human capital, as well as social 
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practices and cultural patterns, tenets, and traditions. Like all businesses, ‘successful’ terrorist 
organizations make strategic decisions about desired outcomes, risks, and the allocation of 
resources (Hoffman, 2006; Horgan, 2014; Shelley, 2012). Terrorist leaders routinely engage in 
cost-benefit thinking, including in their choice of targets (Gill et al, 2018; Sandler and Lapen, 
1988), and in assessing the risks and impact of counter-terrorism strategies directed against them 
(e.g. Sandler and Enders, 2004; Gill, 2018). 
If we are to properly understand women’s experience at the extremes we need to augment 
feminist analyses of personal motivation for terrorist activism within the wider frame of  why 
women have relatively recently been ‘let in’. 
Gender, or more specifically, the use of women in terrorism, has now become another 
important variable in terrorist leaders’ business calculations. The most cynical explanation is that 
women are more expendable as foot soldiers than men. But terrorist organizations almost 
certainly have a more sophisticated understanding of the instrumental and symbolic impact of 
gender stereotypes in target societies, and regularly exploit these to strategic advantage (Laster 
and Erez, 2015). For instance, it has been observed that organizations deliberately recruit women 
because of the publicity they inevitably attract (e.g. Bloom, 2011a; 2011b; Brunner, 2005; Naco, 
2005).  
The national causes that drive insurgent groups, including the Palestinian Hamas and 
Fatah organizations, receive amplified public attention when women are involved in terrorist 
operations, even more so when females carry out suicide bombings.17 Acts of destruction and 
death perpetrated by women attract significantly more media attention compared with male 
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perpetrators, both in the West and in the Middle East (e.g. Bloom, 2007; Berko and Erez, 
2007).18  
Media reports typically frame the involvement of women in terrorist activity as an 
indication of the depth of resistance movements (Ali, 2006; Bloom, 2004). There is, therefore, 
great symbolic force in demonstrating the political resolve of a terrorist organization prepared to 
sacrifice its women as foot soldiers.  There are also major propaganda and practical benefits in 
the publicity which terrorist acts by women attract. For example, having to fight against women 
can undermine the morale and psychological well-being of soldiers engaged in the fight against 
terrorism (Bloom, 2011a). Women taking up arms can also potentially goad more men into 
radical activism (Ali, 2006; Hasso, 2005) since the assumption is that, “if women can do it, so 
can men” (Izraeli, 1999). 
Beyond its propaganda and practical advantages, terrorist organizations have 
recognized that women are a strategic military asset. They are especially useful in terrorist 
operations involving ‘‘soft” or civilian targets (Bloom, 2011a). Women can gain relatively 
easy access to densely populated sites such as markets and hospitals19 where large numbers of 
civilians congregate (Bloom, 2011a). The deployment of women provides another major 
advantage for terrorist organizations: the element of surprise. Women are generally better able 
to avoid detection (Cunningham, 2007; Berko and Erez, 2007) which is why Palestinian 
terrorist organizations have on occasions sent men dressed as women to perpetrate terrorist 
attacks.20   
In the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, women have managed to penetrate well-guarded 
areas, such as checkpoints, by virtue of being women. Israeli soldiers, for example, were 
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initially reluctant to apply the rigorous standards of male security checks to women. Since 
women are less likely to arouse suspicion and be stopped at checkpoints for routine security 
searches, their involvement increases the likelihood of a successful attack (Berko and Erez, 
2007; Erez and Berko, 2008).  
Some terrorist groups have also found that an attractive woman serves as effective 
distraction. In recent years, some terrorist organizations have selected women volunteers 
based on their appearance (Bloom, 2011a). The 2003 suicide bombing by an attractive 
Palestinian female law student, Hanadi Jaradat, in the Maxim restaurant in Haifa that killed 
21 people, is a case in point (Blair, 2003). 
Although some women have become suicide bombers in the Palestinian cause, the 
majority of women recruited serve in a variety of support roles which fall short of martyrdom. 
For instance, women are most likely to serve as lookouts, scouts, and intelligence gatherers 
for terrorist organizations. They also fulfil important enabling functions such as buying cell 
phones on behalf of male terrorists, providing material support such as cooking, or cover for 
operations. Women have also provided assistance in the manufacture of explosives, and 
through their social and familial networks, are instrumental in the recruitment of other women 
into terrorist work. Palestinian women, at times with children, regularly accompany male 
terrorists travelling to a target to create the impression of an innocent family outing thereby 
avoiding suspicion and detection (Berko and Erez, 2007; Erez and Berko, 2008).  
Nevertheless, for all the strategic and practical benefits afforded through the engagement 
of women in the business of terrorism, there are significant political and social costs for terrorist 
organizations occasioned by women’s involvement. These costs, in turn, become the price that 
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participating women pay for their involvement, as reflected in their retrospective assessment of 
their terrorism experiences.    
 Cultural Fault-lines: The Costs of Women as Terrorists  
The rhetoric about, and attitudes toward, the involvement of Palestinian women in 
terrorism have changed dramatically over the last decade (Laster & Erez, 2015). Nevertheless, 
involving women in terrorist activity is still a fraught political decision.  An incarcerated Hamas 
leader summarized in his interview the dilemma the Palestinian community faces when women 
participate in terrorism: “It is forbidden for a girl to live outside the house, especially to live in 
prison. Even when we send her to study at a university we don't feel good about it."  
In the cost-benefit equation, whatever the strategic advantages, actively involving women 
presents serious reputational risks for terrorist organizations. Terrorist leadership continually has 
to manage the potential loss of social capital among its support base because women’s 
involvement challenges core cultural precepts. 
To ensure that social conventions about women’s honor are maintained, they need to 
expend extra resources on logistics.  Thus, the interviews revealed that transporting female 
recruits to training requires another woman to be present in the car so that female participants are 
not seen alone with a man. In preparing women to be dispatched to a target, the organization 
employs other women around the clock to offer the recruit moral and social support. As 
discussed by the interviewees, other women are often used to strengthening the recruit’s resolve, 
allay her anxieties about her family and manage her loneliness and pining for her family.  
Having women operatives involved ostensibly satisfies the chaperoning requirements and 
minimizes any moral blemish on the reputation of a potential female martyr. The thinly disguised 
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underlying political concern, however, is with the reputation of the organization among its key 
constituencies because its operations compromise the high social value placed on the 
preservation of women’s honor.  
A major challenge for all terrorist organizations is maintaining their legitimacy and 
support base, and thus survival. Involving women in terrorism therefore remains a serious 
cultural fault line in a patriarchal society. It can even potentially undermine international 
sympathy for their political cause (Laster and Erez, 2015).21 
Interviewed Palestinian terrorism functionaries were also concerned that engaging 
women in terrorist missions would diminish the glory and respect that a successful operation 
conferred on men. Dispatchers who used female recruits admitted in their interviews that they 
were likely to be subject to gossip and scorn. One dispatcher confessed that for this reason, he 
had tried to conceal women’s involvement in a suicide bombing operation. 
Recruiters and dispatchers of female terrorists expressed reservations about the marginal 
gains afforded by women to operational outcomes. They generally shared traditional views about 
the best way for women to advance the national cause—through the bearing of sons who would 
become future ‘freedom fighters’. In one interview, a dispatcher who sent one woman on a 
successful suicide bombing mission, for example, lamented her death, “It’s a pity I sent her to 
blow herself up; she could have given birth to three men like me."  
For terrorist organizations, engaging women in terrorist activism requires considerable 
reputation risk management. For instance, they need to deal with the fallout when a woman’s 
family discovers that she has left home (Berko and Erez, 2007). To avoid being blamed for 
leading women astray, terrorist organizations have had to develop protocols requiring women 
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recruits to sign documents attesting that they had volunteered for the mission, and that they had 
initiated the contact with the organization. This is necessary to avoid a ‘blood feud’ against the 
organization for ‘expropriating’ a woman from her father’s jurisdiction. The imprisonment of 
women can also give rise to complaints against the organization, as women’s incarceration 
brings disgrace on the family (Erez and Berko, 2008). 
The interviews with Palestinian leaders and community stakeholders reveal deep 
concerns about women’s participation in terrorist activism.  Even interviewees who recognized 
the strategic advantages afforded by women were nonetheless acutely aware that their 
involvement comes at a high price. 
The involvement of Palestinian women in suicide bombings in particular, attracts strong 
opposition from fundamentalist religious groups in Palestinian society (Berko and Erez, 2007; 
Bloom, 2007). A successful detonation by a woman means that the female suicide bomber’s 
intimate body parts are exposed, or worse still, they become intermingled with the remains of  
her victims, some of whom are men. The exposure of female intimate body parts is, according to 
an interviewed Shari'a judge, "...a problem. That's nakedness, lewdness. The body of a woman is 
a'wra”. [a breach of the religious injunction that a woman's  private parts should only be revealed  
to a spouse]. 
A more general cultural concern expressed by the interviewees was the violation of 
gender segregation. Hanging over all missions is the real or imagined transgression of strict 
taboos on sexual contact between men and women. As one community leader put it, 
…She left home without permission to carry out an attack? She must have met men who 
enlisted her; where they were hiding…bad things [likely] happened [i.e., sexual 
relations]…and people build on their fantasies.  
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Several Palestinian community leaders expressed alarm at the unsupervised contact between men 
and women during terrorist operations. These interviewees noted that in recruiting and preparing 
for terrorist missions, male recruiters and dispatchers had opportunities to initiate contact with 
women and to develop illicit relationships with them. For this reason, one high-ranking Hamas 
official confessed that he would never allow his own daughter out, even to participate in a public 
demonstration.22  This concern was raised by one of the women interviewed, using this 
metaphor: 
Woman’s honor is like a vase (jara). If it breaks and you try to fix it, it will never look 
the same. You can always see the crack; it cannot be erased.  
 
In the interviews with male operatives involved in the recruitment or deployment of 
women in terrorist actions, many noted the risks of being tainted by their involvement in 
forbidden interactions with women.  
There was also awareness among some of the Palestinian leader interviewees that 
women’s participation in terrorist activity could, in the longer term, undermine the established 
social hierarchy and as well as the moral fabric of Palestinian society. Several Palestinian leaders 
and stakeholders were concerned that, in the words of one interviewed leader, “the woman will 
think she is the captain in the home.”  They cautioned that if women are perceived as capable of 
participating in “military activities,” they may want to take on other responsibilities and enjoy 
privileges accorded to men, thereby disturbing the proper division of labor between the sexes, the 
foundation of Palestinian social order.  
The women interviewed were aware of this barrier, and of the Palestinian community’s 
approach to women’s involvement in activities that are the preserve of men. As one incarcerated 
female terrorist observed,  
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A woman cannot succeed in her role; they will not let her succeed . . . there are people for 
whom it is not good to see a woman as a leader or a woman in an important role. 
 
The community leaders in the sample were also acutely aware of the challenge that the 
involvement of women presented to male status in a patriarchal culture. In a macho social order, 
the participation of women is an embarrassment to their menfolk. One of the woman 
interviewees described how, when her brother visited her in prison, he covered his eyes to avoid 
seeing the shameful image of his imprisoned sister. As she noted, “Seeing me in prison is 
something he cannot bear to see. He is ashamed that I, a woman, am in prison whereas he, being 
a man, is in [sic] the outside.”  Women’s involvement in terrorist activism undermines 
masculinist ideology- patriarchy had failed in its duty to protect its women (Hasso, 2005: 30).   
Whatever the rhetoric of New Terrorism might suggest,23 for Palestinian society, 
militancy and violence have been essential to the construction of masculinity, rather than to the 
affirming of female identity (Hasso, 2005: 29). As a consequence, for women both individually 
and collectively, involvement in terrorist activity is a costly undertaking.  
No Woman’s Land: The costs of terrorism for women 
While feminist research on female terrorists initially emphasized women’s agency (e.g. 
Bloom, 2011a) and the advantages that they bring to terrorism (for summary see de Leede, 
2018), less attention has been paid to the risks and costs for women of their involvement in a 
previously an all-male preserve.   
Palestinian women who choose to respond to the call to join the national struggle and 
participate in terrorist operations are caught in a classic double bind: doing what they have been 
told is their national responsibility simultaneously threatens and contradicts their femininity and 
womanhood as defined by hegemonic patriarchy (Ali, 2006).   
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Recruitment of women by male operatives, whether through face-to-face contact, via the 
Internet, or cell phone,24 entails risk for women. They are often young, with little involvement in 
the outside world. They may also be physically unsuitable or emotionally unprepared for the 
assignment.  One female would-be suicide bomber for example, explained in her interview that 
the weight of the bomb caused her to get “stuck to the ground”.  For others, who had rarely 
strayed much beyond their home and its environs, finding their way to a target was difficult as 
they became disoriented. In other cases, women recruits panicked when they encountered 
unanticipated problems.  
 Palestinian women, who are generally inexperienced in dealing with men outside of their 
family, may find their interactions with men exciting, but also confusing. A young woman 
interviewee who was recruited over the Internet referred to her recruiter, whom she had never 
met in person, as “her lover.” Some of the interviewed young women admitted that they were 
fond of, or in love, with their handler and that they had believed that his feelings for them were 
genuine.   
 Interviewed Palestinian leaders and community notables acknowledged that young 
women are probably exploited emotionally and even sexually as part and parcel of the 
recruitment process, since women outside the protective sphere of the family are seen, in a 
highly gender segregated society, as ‘fair game’. In the words of one leader, “If a man rapes or 
gets raped, it’s not important. A woman has to be obedient, in society and at home; people will 
say, what was she thinking [participating in a mission]?” 
The double-standards applied to women generally are very apparent in the attitudes of 
male terrorists toward their female recruits.  One interviewed dispatcher, recounting his final 
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moments with a female recruit about to embark on a suicide mission, described how she first 
prepared a meal for him before leaving for her death, adding wryly, “when a woman leaves the 
kitchen, it is only to do something bad.” 
In many countries, the status of female soldiers who fight alongside men in war or 
revolution is enhanced. By contrast, Palestinian women who, in the words of our interviewees, 
“do military work,” inevitably find their status significantly diminished. They do not reap the 
respect and recognition accorded to female soldiers in most countries, let alone to their 
Palestinian fellow male combatants. Sometimes this is demonstrated in subtle but symbolically 
significant ways – one female interviewee, for example, complained that male suicide bombers 
were video tapped wearing the explosive belt prior to the mission whereas the women were 
merely photographed. 
If a woman dies as a shaheeda (female martyr), her death can be used for political 
mileage. Building up her contribution also displaces the anger that might otherwise be directed at 
the organization from her family. A few women suicide bombers are accorded a revered status as 
a martyr like Wafa idris -- the first female Palestinian suicide bomber, who killed one Israeli and 
injured more than one hundred people in Jerusalem. But death is the highest price that a woman 
can pay for esteem. And a woman who fails in her mission is not accorded due recognition, 
however great her motivation and effort. But at least, through her death, a female suicide bomber 
solves the problem of how to treat women involved in terrorist missions on their return to their 
families and community (see also Davis, 2013).     
Many young Palestinian women charged with security offenses in Israel plead guilty at 
the first opportunity. Doing so avoids having to go to trial which would lead to disclosures about 
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their behavior, including that they were wearing Western clothes, had spent time in the company 
of men, and other facts which would cause them to lose face and humiliate their families (Erez 
and Berko, 2008). 
Women who do contest the charges generally provide lengthy and elaborate explanations 
to prove their moral innocence. For instance, the female interviewees were at pains to point out 
that they stayed with a girlfriend in a women’s dormitory or that there was another woman in the 
car when they were transported. It was apparent that the women invest considerable energy in 
hiding or denying behavior that may stigmatize them or bring shame on their families.  
But disgrace is almost inevitable. As one interviewed Palestinian leader explained it,  
A woman who winds up in prison, regardless, her status is inferior. She is not ideal 
woman… I don't think anyone would want to marry such a woman. She in not normative; 
she is deviant, atypical and crosses all the lines. In a macho society she is a woman who 
has taken the direction of being a man, a woman who lost her femininity in a society 
ruled by men.   
While imprisoned Palestinian women convicted of terrorism-related offenses have a 
higher status that their sisters convicted of common crimes (Berko, Erez, and Globokar, 2010), 
they do not receive the respect and status accorded to their Palestinian male counterparts. An 
imprisoned female terrorist is an embarrassment to her family. In the prison environment she is 
not, in the traditional world view, within to the protective sphere of the family, or under proper 
patriarchal control. Incarceration means that women will be exposed to activities that are deemed 
inappropriate for “good women.”  If they do not disown their errant daughters and sisters, some 
families still refuse to visit them in prison.  
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Prison life was described by a number of interviewees as harder on women than men 
because, “women are more sensitive than men. It is difficult for us to be far from our families, 
from our friends, from the world outside.”  
Palestinian women serving prison time for security violations also reflected on how the 
path that they had chosen had adversely affected their life chances, especially their prospects of 
becoming wives and mothers on their release.   
 
There is a difference between a man and a woman in prison. For a woman the 
prison is more difficult than for a man. It is dependent on the sentence... A woman thinks 
of her future, if she will get out or not. A man, if he sits 10 year or 15 years, when he is 
released he can build his life… A woman is not like a man. It is important how old she is 
because it is difficult for her to build her life and look at the future if she older than 30. 
 
This negative trajectory for women is in marked contrast to the positive experience of 
male operatives who ‘fail’ and serve time. Male terrorists are accorded esteem by their 
compatriots both inside the prison and on their return to their communities. After their prison 
sentence they gain in prestige, receive various rewards, including a high status marriage and even 
leadership posts in their respective terrorist organizations.25   Men are seen as heroic figures 
entitled to special treatment and honor. By contrast, the women interviewees were in many cases 
resigned, in other cases quite disillusioned, by the negative impact that their involvement in 
terrorism had on their lives and future. In a rhetorical cris de coeur, one of the female 
interviewees angrily lamented, “Do men respect me? They ought to respect me. Men and women 
ought to respect what I did. I did not do it for myself.”   
For methodological reasons related to interviewing women prisoners via life stories, the 
interviewees were not asked the direct question, “knowing what you know now, would you do it 
all again?” Uniquely, ‘failed’ women terrorist activists have had an opportunity to experience the 
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social consequences of their decisions. For some, without consciously appraising it in this way, it 
exposed the gap between their aspirations, and the reality of the consequences for them as 
women in a patriarchal society. To that extent, honest answers could have shed some light on the 
‘holy grail’ of counter-terrorism (Radlauer, 2013) -- what works as specific and general 
deterrence for women to refrain, or at least disengage, from terrorist activism?  
Conclusion: A Balanced Scorecard? 
As a broad conceptual framework, a cost-benefit approach can structure  assessments of 
the subjective and objective factors weighed up by both individuals and organizations when 
making decisions about a course of action (Sen, 2000), including involvement in the violent 
activity of terrorism (e.g. Hausken, 2018;  Crenshaw and  LaFree, 2017).  
There are, though, limits to applying strict cost-benefit framework to terrorism generally, 
and to women’s involvement in particular. Weighing up risks and opportunities is always about 
‘best guesses’ based on imperfect knowledge (Sen, 2017; Gill et al., 2018).   It is, for instance, 
impossible to know whether the organizational call to include women in active combat, in time, 
will be regarded as a catalyst or a hindrance to the achievement of greater gender equality or 
indeed, the longer-term political objectives of the Palestinian people. 
An economic model, traditional cost benefit analysis attaches a financial value to 
decisions that are, as our qualitative study demonstrates, based largely on subjective, non-
monetary factors (Weimer and Vining, 2017). Thus at the individual level, the stated motives of 
the women interviewees who choose to become combatants, such as revenge, relationships, 
redemption, and our own category of ‘rebellion,’ are emotive responses. Women terrorists show 
no evidence of objectively weighing up the consequences of their actions for themselves or for 
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others. Our research shows that for some women, at least initially, there are subjective 
satisfactions in taking up arms. But, as the study also demonstrates, the apparent advantages 
come at a high price, with major costs for participants themselves and for other women in 
Palestinian society, in addition to the loss of many other lives and the scarring of numerous  
victims, both physically and emotionally (Erez, 2006; Hobfoll et al. 2006; Laufer and Solomon, 
2006; Shamai and Ron, 2008).26  
Palestinian terrorist organizations, though, seemingly do weigh up the tactical, 
operational and symbolic benefits of ‘letting women in’ to the front line of terrorist activism. But 
at the same time, they simultaneously recognize that the deployment of women in nationalist 
activism also has a destabilizing impact on the social fabric of Palestinian society, and comes at 
the cost of significant reputational risk for the organization. From a feminist perspective, this 
kind of challenge to patriarchal values might be regarded as a welcome development. But there is 
no evidence that allowing women to be part of terrorist activism has, or will, improve women’s 
social position in Palestinian society.  
The answer to whether the benefits of employing women in terrorism outweigh its costs 
for individuals or organizations remains, like terrorism itself (Kimhi et al., 2009) in the eye of 
the beholder. It is impossible to know whether recourse to terrorism, including by women 
activists, in time will be regarded as a catalyst or a hindrance to the achievement of greater 
gender equality or indeed, the longer-term political objectives of the Palestinian people.  
In practical terms, at the very least, cost-benefit analysis can inform counter-terrorism 
strategies. The diverse narratives, including those of failure and disappointment, need be 
captured and retold, particularly online where recruitment propaganda flourishes. Incorporating 
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stories into early intervention counter-radicalization programs may be a useful tool to discredit 
political rhetoric. 
But as our research demonstrates, there is no ‘one size fits all’ approach. The counter 
narratives cannot refute a belief in, for instance, religious jihad or martyrdom. They might 
though highlight the extra ‘pain of imprisonment’ for women who fail in their mission and thus 
might be sufficient to dissuade at least some impressionable young women from the ‘seductions’ 
of a, briefly, more exciting, but ultimately unrewarding and perilous life choice. 
Enhancing family supports to both deter and reintegrate vulnerable women who become 
involved in terrorist activism is a well-known counter-terrorism strategy. However, from a 
feminist perspective, counter-terrorist measures predicated on reinforcing gender inequality and 
patriarchal dominance cannot be condoned. Rebellion against strict family control was, in fact, 
one of the factors prompting some of our cohort to engage in terrorist activism. The disjunction 
between their day-to-day lives and their desire for a more fulfilling (or exciting) life is unlikely 
to be resolved by sending them back to the limited sphere of the family.  
The research suggests that the longer term objectives of counterterrorism might need to 
focus on promoting sustainable ways in which women in patriarchal societies can be afforded 
opportunities to fully, or at least meaningfully, participate in the public sphere. The apparent 
(and short-lived) liberation offered by women’s engagement in terrorist activism remains a 
double-edged sword - wounding, and not infrequently killing, the women who choose to wield it.  
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Footnotes 
                                                          
1 The old definition of Terrorism by the League of Nations in 1937 declared that terrorist acts 
include ‘all criminal acts directed against a State and intended or calculated to create a state of 
terror in the minds of particular persons or a group of persons or the general public’.1 The nation 
state as the focus has become less pronounced over time, however most commentators now agree 
that the constituent elements of Terrorism include: (1) the intentional use of violence; (2) against 
non-combatant targets (including both civilians and iconic symbols); (3) to create 
fear/terror/psychic harm; (4) by virtue of the widest possible publicity coverage for the 
group/cause/ individual; (5) pursuing political, religious or ideological objectives. Needless to 
say, these objectives are achieved by inflicting the greatest possible damage, including loss of 
life, on mostly indiscriminate, victims.  ‘New Terrorism’ has come to be understood as the 21st 
century version of terrorist activism which, for some commentators, began with 9/11, but for 
others started much earlier, in the 1990s. New Terrorism marks a noticeable shift from previous 
forms of terrorist activity which, generally, used even extreme force as leverage to negotiate 
specific political demands. Laqueur (1999) outlines a revolutionary change in the aims and 
techniques which delineate New Terrorism — specifically the pursuit of indiscriminate (rather 
than focused) targets with the objective of killing as many people as possible. Unlike earlier 
forms of Terrorism, which sought to have specific political demands met, New Terrorism is bent 
on the destruction and elimination of whole societies and social systems. Commentators also 
note that while modern Terrorism was largely secular, the motivating driver of New Terrorism is 
religion, predominantly, but not exclusively, Islam. 
2 In this article we refer mostly to Palestinians who live in the West Bank and Gaza, and are 
directly affected by, or involved in, the conflict with Israel. 
 
3 Inappropriate behavior may cover a wide range of behaviors that may signify that a woman is 
independent or attempts to get outside the family purview (e.g. studying abroad), dressing in an 
inappropriate manner, refusing to marry the man designated by her family, or violating other 
gender expectations about modesty (e.g. Hasan, 2005) 
 
4 Generally, the importance of having large families in Palestinian/Arab society in Israel and the 
Palestinian territories serves various aims including attempts to rebalance the demography of 
Israel. 
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5 Sheik Yassin was assassinated by the Israel Defense Forces in March 2004. 
 
6 Maariv, 20 August 2005 
 
7 See  http://www.inn.co.il:80/News/Flash.aspx/185204 “we will send female suicide bombers to 
prevent invasions (of Gaza) by Israel Defense Forces (IDF), Al-Kuds brigade, the military wing 
of  Islamic Jihad warns that tens of Palestinian women are ready to blow themselves up near IDF 
forces” 
 
8 The notion of bounded rationality emerged because of the strong critiques of the self-interested 
homo economicus assumption (e.g. Bourdieu, 2005) underlying neo-liberalism, which have led 
social scientists to posit a more pluralistic notion of ‘rational choice’ which recognizes the role 
and impact of culture in decision-making. 
9 Bloom’s fifth category was Rape, which is largely applicable to Chechen women terrorists. 
10 This difference, it has been argued, may be a function of Palestinian women’s sheltered 
backgrounds which meant that they may not have had the same opportunities to acquire the 
lexicon and ideological rhetoric to which the men would have been exposed (Horgan, 2011).  
11 As current or prospective breadwinners, this issue is important for men. The Palestinian 
Authority pays a monthly pension to the families of those who participate in terrorism and are 
arrested or killed; a formula of the amount of money a family receives relates it to the length of 
the sentence imposed (and thus severity of the offense/harm inflicted on Israeli citizens) – the 
longer the sentence, the higher the pension.  
12 Some argue that motivations such as redemption and relationships in suicide bombing cases 
comprise structural coercion; women who have violated, or accused of violating, gender norms 
feel compelled to address the shame and seek redemption. Also, women, who are dependent 
economically or emotionally on terrorist men feel obliged to comply with their orders to 
participate (Serendip, 2012). In this article, we include examples of explicit coercion, where the 
women were forced to participate, not merely structurally feel they have no other options. 
 
13 The sense of thrill and excitement was also present in the interviewed Palestinian adolescent 
males, but in their case, the thrill of terrorism-related activities was in  demonstrating manhood 
(see Berko, Erez, and Gur, 2017). 
 
14 As noted above, while most women participation was voluntary, in some instances, particularly 
with the young women whose main motivation was search for excitement, elements of coercion 
or entrapment were present; once the women were introduced to the world of terrorism but did 
not want to follow through with the assigned mission , various forms of coercion were used (e.g. 
Erez and Berko 2007). 
 
15 Palestinian terrorist, Laila Khaled, who planned and executed  in 1969 the hijacking of TWA 
840 flight, making the pilot fly over Haifa, her birthplace, and demanding that air traffic control 
refer to the plane as Popular Front Free Arab Palestine, is a unique case. Khaled belonged to the 
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Marxist-leaning Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, thus did not have to contend with a 
patriarchal Islamic hierarchy (Palmer, 2010) 
16 If we accept the structuralist approach of Catharine MacKinnon (1987) and others, then the 
level of stigmatization or violence (actual and via linguistic construction) of women under 
patriarchy means that it is almost impossible to isolate ‘individual choice’ for women. In any 
case, the classic philosophical concept of ‘autonomy’ becomes practically meaningless.  
17 It should be noted that in most cases, the women who perpetrate terrorism are not members of 
the terrorist organizations that send them on their missions; often organizations “take ownership” 
of the women’s actions after the fact, or just prior to it (Berko and Erez, 2007). In the lone wolf 
attacks that characterized the more recent acts of terrorism, participating girls and women were 
not aligned with any terrorist organization (see Margolin, 2016: 93; Sela-Shayovitz, 2019) .  
 
18 See Israeli (2004) for analysis of the Palestinian and Arab media regarding the role of women 
in the Palestinian struggle, and Hasso (2005) and Patkin (2004) for the media construction of 
women suicide bombers. 
19 A well-known case is a young woman from Gaza who has been severely burnt in a kitchen 
cooking accident, and Israeli authorities allowed her to receive treatment at the Soroka hospital 
in the south of Israel. The woman was then approached by a terrorist organization with demands 
to carry explosives, which she was supposed to detonate in the hospital. 
 
20 In the Park hotel attack, perpetrated during the Passover holiday meal (Seder) of March 2002, 
32 hotel guests were killed and 160 guests and staff were wounded. The male perpetrator of the 
suicide bombing was dressed in women’s clothing. 
 
21 One of the major propaganda points used by the Bush administration to support the “war on 
terror’ was to highlight the victimhood of women living under oppressive patriarchal regimes 
(see Laster and Erez, 2015). 
 
22 Women’s participation in demonstrations in the Palestinian territories largely remains an 
acceptable way of expressing resistance and supporting the Palestinian national cause (see 
Tsoref, 2006).   
 
23 See Israeli’s (2004) analysis of the Palestinian and Arab media regarding the role of women in 
the Palestinian struggle; see also Hasso, 2005 and Patkin, 2004 for the media construction of 
women suicide bombers. 
 
24 In some cases, women received a cell phone from an operative (an expensive commodity in the 
area), as a sign of friendship or romantic interest. The women were told that they can use the 
phone cell only to call the operative. This “friendship” cell phone was then, often unknowingly, 
used to blow up explosives that the woman carried. 
 
25 For instance, the current chief of Hamas in Gaza, Yahya Sinwar, spent 22 years in an Israeli 
prison for killing collaborators and involvement in other terrorist activities. He was released from 
prison in the 2011 Shalit exchange. Samir Kuntar, a Lebanese Druze member of the Palestine 
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Liberation Front and Hezbollah, convicted of terrorism and murder by an Israeli court, was 
released from prison as part of the 2008 Israel–Hezbollah prisoner exchange. He served 29 years 
in Israeli prison, and upon release received Syria's highest medal, honored by Iranian 
President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.  
 
26 These studies detail the impact of terrorism on children, adults, first responders, social 
workers, documenting devastating psychological impact including PTSD that were diagnosed 
among both Jewish and Arab citizens of Israel. In addition to the primary and secondary victims 
(family and friends of actual victims, including first responders), there are also tertiary victims of 
terrorism, who are exposed to the horrific harm inflicted on primary victims through the media. 
